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ABSTRACT
This study examined the impact of situational and 
individual characteristics on sales representatives' 
propensity to lie or to tell the truth. The situation­
al elements were the honesty of the organisation 
climate and its formal rules about lying to cus­
tomers. The individual elements were the partici­
pants' degree of Machiavellianism and tolerance 
for ambiguity. The results indicated that more 
Machiavellian people were more likely to lie and 
that they were less guided by the rules than people 
who were low in this trait. In addition, rules and 
climate work together for people with a high toler­
ance for ambiguity in a complex manner.
INTRODUCTION
Ethical behaviour in business continues to receive 
empirical and theoretical attention that is undoubt­
edly fuelled by headline news stories such as the 
Enron accounting practices scandal or Martha
Stewart lying about insider trading. However, 
while major economic fraud may generate drama, 
people behave ethically and unethically every day 
on the job. A recurring theme in the business 
ethics literature questions the extent to which cor­
porate codes of ethics influence everyday behav­
iour (Cressey & Moore, 1983; Trevino, Butterfield, 
& McCabe, 2001). A parallel theme questions the 
comparative impact on behaviour of personal dif­
ferences versus structural elements of a situation 
(Giacalone & Knouse, 1990; Hegarty & Sims, 
1978; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). The present 
study examines everyday business behaviour by 
exploring how corporate culture, or expectations, 
and individual differences influence deception, 
specifically the situational and individual explana­
tions for why people lie or tell the truth at work.
It is well established in the social science literature 
that people behave more and less honestly depend­
ing on the situation. In fact, Hartshome and May 
(1928), in their quest for the dishonest personality, 
found that most people behaved dishonestly when 
provided with the opportunity. People in the work­
place find themselves facing various circum­
stances under which they lie. Some contexts, such 
as a competitive negotiation, place people in a 
frame of mind that allows them to lie (Boles, 
Croson, & Mumighan, 2000). Similarly, conflict­
ing demands, or role conflicts, might be resolved 
to some degree by lying (Grover, 1993b). For 
example, Grover (1993a) found that nurses were 
more prone to lying in medical charts when they 
were faced with conflicting expectations between 
the physician's orders and nursing obligations, and 
Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma (2004) found that 
people lied about their performance when they 
failed to achieve a difficult goal.
Situational norms influence ethical behaviour, and 
the organisational studies literature has a history 
of investigating how norms, or the commonly held 
group beliefs, shape individual behaviour. Going
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by different labels, such as climate, culture, shared 
beliefs, and social information processing (Enz, 
1988; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Schneider, 1975), 
they share the overarching idea that the attitudes 
and opinions of people around us influence our 
ethical actions and beliefs. For example, some 
automobile dealerships have a collective belief 
that reinforces the idea that nearly any behaviour 
is acceptable to closing a deal with a customer, 
whereas others share a belief that closing the deal 
should be balanced with humane treatment of the 
customer.
Research on how shared beliefs affect ethical 
behaviour is largely based on Victor and Cullen's 
(1988) ethical climate taxonomy, which classifies 
the manner in which organisational participants 
collectively interpret and make sense of ethical 
issues (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Victor, 2003; Forte, 
2004; Fritsche, 2000; Peterson, 2002; Stone & 
Henry, 2003; Weber & Seger, 2002). However, the 
impact of various ethical climates is not clear. 
Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe (2001) conduct­
ed one of the few studies that deeply analysed the 
impact of ethical context, dividing it into ethical 
climate and ethical culture. Climate is an informal, 
attitudinal categorisation of the ethical context. In 
contrast, culture refers to the artefacts and repre­
sentations of the ethical beliefs of the company. 
The distinction between ethical culture and climate 
helps to interpret how company rules of conduct 
make a difference. Culture has a manifestation, 
and it has more of an impact on the observed ethi­
cal behaviour in companies that have codes of eth­
ical conduct compared to those that do not have 
codes. Moreover, it was apparent that companies 
that had codes were those that promoted honesty 
and ethics (Trevino et al., 2001). In contrast to cul­
ture, ethical climate is comprised of the subjective, 
shared beliefs about the ethical standing of the 
company, and has more of an effect in companies 
that have no code of conduct. Presumably, people 
working for companies without a code seek social 
information to decide how to behave ethically or 
unethically, that is, to decide whether behaviour is 
ethical or not. Hence, Trevino and her colleagues 
(2001) found that in the absence of a code of con­
duct ethical behaviour was related to the climate. 
The direct impact of culture, codes, or rules on 
deception has received little empirical attention. 
An exception is Aquino's (1998) study of purchas­
ing agents, which found that the salience of ethical
standards in an organisation influenced the level of 
honesty in negotiations.
The present study investigates lying and truth­
telling among sales representatives in an organisa­
tion. Following Trevino and colleagues' (2001) 
theory, we expect that both ethical climate and 
rules influence honesty. The informal climate 
forms part of the social information that provides 
people with cues about their own and others' 
behaviour. This social information tells people 
about what is acceptable and unacceptable. In a 
more formal, but related manner, company rules 
provide concrete information about what is 
acceptable and unacceptable in the workplace. In 
the absence of countervailing information, people 
often make choices of a moral nature based on the 
formal rules set out by a collective or authority. In 
terms of Kohlberg's (1969) theory of cognitive 
moral development, most adults are at the middle, 
“conventional” level of moral reasoning, in which 
they are guided by the formal signposts of moral 
behaviour. Given that formal and informal cues 
from the environment influence ethical behaviour, 
it seems reasonable that people are more likely to 
lie or tell the truth as a sub-category of ethical 
behaviour based on the cues they observe in their 
environment, leading to the following hypotheses. 
Moreover, based on the work of Trevino and her 
colleagues (2001), the two factors are expected to 
combine so that people tell the truth most when 
both the climate and formal rules support honesty.
Hypothesis 1: People will tell the truth
more often when the climate supports and 
endorses truth telling.
Hypothesis 2: People will tell the truth
more often when there are form al rules in 
place that support truth-telling and honesty.
Hypothesis 3: Ethical climate and formal 
rules will combine such that people are 
most likely to tell the truth when they are 
congruent
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
While situational influences may affect behaviour, 
people also individually vary in their likelihood of 
behaving ethically (Giacalone & Knouse, 1990; 
Trevino, 1986). Individual levels of 
Machiavellianism account for individual honesty
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(Christie & Geis, 1970). The construct is based on 
Machiavelli's Prince, which is a veritable instruc­
tion booklet for a despotic ruler to use virtually 
any means to an end. People who are highly 
Machiavellian are less bound by social norms in 
accomplishing their goals. People who identify 
highly with the Machiavellian personality are 
more likely to use lying as a business tool (Ross & 
Robertson, 2000). However, Machiavellians do 
not lie in any single instance; rather, they lie when 
it benefits them to do so. Machiavellians require 
some cause or reason to lie from which they will 
benefit. Therefore, Machiavellians react more 
strongly to work contexts that prompt lying. In 
general, people are more prone to lie when they 
are attempting to satisfy difficult goals 
(Schweitzer et al., 2004). Given that they are try­
ing to satisfy a goal, it seems reasonable to expect 
that people who are more instrumental in moving 
toward their goals will be more likely to lie. 
Machiavellianism is a personality trait that cap­
tures this instrumental concept, and, measured as 
an individual difference, taps the extent to which 
people believe that the means justify the ends 
(Christie & Geis, 1970).
Hypothesis 4: People who are more
Machiavellian tend to lie more when faced 
with pressureful demands.
Machiavellianism indicates a tendency to work 
outside the rules to obtain one's ends, and as such 
represents a departure from reliance on social 
norms. It seems reasonable, therefore, that highly 
Machiavellian people should be less sensitive to 
environmental cues about ethics than their coun­
terparts who hold this trait less strongly.
Hypothesis 5: The lying behaviour o f high­
ly Machiavellian people will be less sensi­
tive to rules and ethical climate compared to 
people who are low in Machiavellianism.
The manner in which people interpret their envi­
ronments, specifically the importance of formal 
rules and ethical information from colleagues, 
varies from person to person. One personality trait 
that taps an interesting dimension of this environ­
mental interpretation is tolerance for ambiguity, a 
trait that reflects how comfortably individuals 
process ambiguous information. People who have 
a high tolerance for ambiguity should be able to 
make moral choices in the absence of environ­
mental cues. Most notably these high tolerance
for ambiguity individuals should be relatively less 
influenced in their ethical decision making by the 
existence o f  formal strictures regarding the ethical 
issue. For example, a university could have formal 
rules about what constitutes plagiarism or not have 
formalised the concept. People with a high toler­
ance for ambiguity are expected to be more adept 
at making decisions in the absence of such rules.
Hypothesis 6: The lying behaviour of people high 
in tolerance for ambiguity will be less influenced 
by formal rules about lying.
It is less certain how workers at various levels of 
ambiguity will react to different ethical climates. 
Again, people who are relatively high in this trait 
might be more comfortable processing ethical infor­
mation from their colleagues, because this informa­
tion by its very nature is ambiguous. As one exam­
ple, some studies have found that people at higher 
levels of moral development are more adept at find­
ing their moral way regardless of the situational con­
straints (Grover, 1993b; Trevino & Youngblood, 
1990). On the other hand, people low in tolerance 
for ambiguity might just be less influenced by the 
social information because they are not so adept at 
grappling with this amorphous information. 
Therefore, we arrive at the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7: People high in tolerance for  
ambiguity will be more influenced in their 
lying behaviour by social information drawn 
from the ethical climate than will people low 
in this trait.
SUMMARY
The hypotheses were tested by operating a work 
simulation that placed people under pressure, 
which has led to deceptive behaviour in other stud­
ies (Grover, 1993b; Grover & Hui, 1994; 
Schweitzer et al., 2004). The ethical information 
about how the company operates was manipulated 
by providing informal social information through 
a friend and by manipulating the formal rules 
under which the company operates. Individual 
difference variables of tolerance for ambiguity and 
Machiavellianism were collected.
METHOD
Three hundred twenty-one undergraduates 
enrolled in an organisational behaviour course in a
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Midwestern U.S. university participated in a labo­
ratory experiment. The participants were typical­
ly third year students who average 20.6 years of 
age; 83% where white, 11% Black American, 6% 
Asian; and 53% were female. The individual dif­
ferences scales were administered as a survey dur­
ing a class session to all participants before they 
participated in the laboratory part of the study. 
The laboratory portion of the study consisted of an 
individual management in-basket exercise. The 
instructions described a robotics manufacturer 
named Robotron, and described the participants' 
role of the sale representative. The sales represen­
tatives' chief responsibility was described as writ­
ing bids in response to requests for bids, and the 
bidding process and product line were also 
described. The stimulus materials were an “in 
box” containing memos, letters, and telephone 
messages for the participants to read, as well as 
client summary sheets that told basic information 
about the clients, and a policy manual. 
Participants were told that they had forty-five min­
utes to complete the exercise, that they must prior­
itize the things they do, and that they must write 
four memos. The recipients of these four memos 
were described and the content of the memos used 
to measure the dependent measure of lying.
The context of the experimental variables con­
cerned an opportunity to mislead a client in order 
to obtain a sale. The client faxed the participant a 
letter stating that he was prepared to recommend 
that the firm's bid be accepted, but needed a deliv­
ery date guaranteed in writing. The participant, 
however, was faced with a dilemma because infor­
mation from engineering indicated that a critical 
component (vacuum coupler) for the particular 
line of equipment was unavailable and the delivery 
date, which was eight months hence, could not be 
met without a delay of at least two months. Being 
complicated, this dilemma was restated to the par­
ticipant in a note from a friend in another part of 
the corporation:
“Since Merving (the client) agreed to the 
delivery date quoted in the bid and now 
manufacturing can't meet that date, it puts 
you in a real bind. Are you going to have to 
promise a delivery date you can't meet in 
order to finalize the Merving Sale? It would 
be awful to lose the sale and all that com­
mission after spending six months on the 
project.”
Previous research suggests that this type of con­
flict provides an opportunity for lying, and there­
fore an opportunity to study our independent vari­
ables (Aquino, 1998; Grover, 1993b; Grover & 
Hui, 1994; Robertson & Rymon, 2001; Schweitzer 
et ah, 2004).
Independent Variables
Ethical Climate. This variable was manipulated in 
the memo that was purportedly sent from the par­
ticipant's friend elsewhere in the corporation. In 
the Honest condition the letter stated; “This com­
pany is so incredibly honest and ethical that it's 
really a problem in this situation because the 
norms around here are such that you have to tell 
the truth.” The Dishonest condition stated: “the 
norms around here are such that it's probably okay 
to “stretch the truth or not be totally honest.” Both 
these manipulated culture conditions added; “That 
is just the kind of corporate culture that exists in 
this place.” The third control condition simply 
made no mention of how the culture might influ­
ence the decision.
Rules. The rules manipulation concerned 
whether there was a formal policy concerning 
scheduling and delivery dates. In the formal con­
dition the first page o f the policy manual 
described a scheduling and delivery policy. The 
policy stated that “it is the policy of Robotron and 
associated companies to provide reliable, accurate, 
and attainable delivery estimates. Specifically, it 
stated that “the salesperson should verify delivery 
dates with engineering and manufacturing 
BEFORE providing a quote to the customer.” The 
policy was the first to appear in the employee 
manual in order to bolster the likelihood that par­
ticipants read the policy. The policy was omitted 
in the No Formal Rules condition. The rules con­
dition was also incorporated in the memo from the 
friend along with the Cultures manipulation. In 
the Formal condition, the friend wrote: “That pol­
icy is on the books, just revised, that deception in 
delivery dates may be grounds for termination,” 
and omitted the sentence in the Control condition.
Individual Difference Variables
Tolerance for Ambiguity. This variable concerns 
the degree to which individuals make clear dis­
tinctions and was measured with Martin and
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Westie's (1959) eight item scale. Sample items 
include: “You can classify almost all people as 
either honest or crooked,” and “there is only one 
right way to do anything.”
Machiavellianism. This variable was meas­
ured with a twenty item scale (Christie & Geis, 
1970). Sample questions include, “Never tell any­
one the real reason you did something unless it is 
useful to do so.” Both individual difference scales 
were answered on a seven point scale ranging from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”
Dependent Variables
The lying items and manipulation checks appeared 
in a post-experimental questionnaire. Two items 
measured lying on a seven point scale anchored at 
“strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” The two 
items appeared on the first, and separate, page of 
the post-experimental questionnaire that specifi­
cally asked questions about the task of writing the 
letter to the purchasing agent who could have 
potentially been deceived. The two questions 
were: “I told the truth while doing this task, and “I 
stated the delivery dates honestly to J. Corbin in 
the memo.” (J. Corbin was the purchasing agent.) 
This self-report measure of honesty focuses on the 
conscious behaviour of lying, which is of theoret­
ical interest. It measures people's beliefs about 
their own behaviour as opposed to people who 
have mistakenly reported the wrong date in the let­
ter. Additionally, honesty is a slippery construct in 
that there are variations. In this experiment people 
could write the letter without mentioning either 
the date or that there is a delay in delivery, or they 
could hedge on the magnitude o f the delay. The 
dependent variable of theoretical interest was 
whether the participants believed they were lying 
or telling the truth.
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation check for ethical climate was 
“the culture at Robotron dictates that sales repre­
sentatives tell customers accurate delivery dates,” 
and was answered on a seven point response scale 
anchored at “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree.” The rules manipulation check item stated 
“this company has rules about honesty,” and the 
seven point response scale was anchored at “com­
pletely false” and “completely true.”
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The analysis of variance of the Rules manipulation 
check item produced a significant Rules main 
effect, F(l,360)=52.35, p<.0001, with the Formal 
Rules condition being rated higher than the No 
Formal Rules condition (M's=5.43 and 4.30). The 
analysis of the Culture manipulation check also 
produced a significant effect, F(2,360)=52.29, 
p<.0001; the Honest ethical climate was rated as 
significantly more honest than the Control, which 
was more honest than the dishonest condition 
(p's<.01, M -5.40, 4.77, 3.35, respectively).
Machiavellianism
The first analysis of lying included the following 
independent variables: Ethical Climate, (Control, 
Honest, Dishonest), Rules (Formal Rules, No 
Formal Rules), and Machiavellianism split at the 
median. As expected, the analysis produced a sig­
nificant Machiavellianism effect, F(2.308)=3.39, 
p<.05, indicating that those high in 
Machiavellianism were significantly more likely 
to lie than those low in the trait (M's=5.70 and 
6.05). The Rules x Machiavellianism interaction 
was marginally significant, F(2,308)=2.57, p<.08. 
However, the means suggest that people who were 
low in Machiavellianism were influenced by the 
existence of formal rules. Low Machiavellians 
were more likely to tell the truth when formal rules 
were present versus absent (M's=5.71 and 6.17). 
In contrast, High Machiavellians were not signifi­
cantly influenced by the existence of formal rules 
governing honesty (M's=5.85 and 5.59). No other 
effects were significant.
Tolerance for Ambiguity
A similar MANOVA was conducted with toler­
ance for ambiguity as an independent personality 
variable. The only significant effect was an 
Ethical Climate x Rules x Tolerance for Ambiguity 
interaction, F(4,616)=3.26, p<.02. This effect was 
further analysed with simple effect analyses. The 
simple Ethical Climate x Rules effect was signifi­
cant for individuals having a high tolerance for 
ambiguity, F(4,248)=2.66, p<.05, but not those 
low on this attribute, F=1.12. Furthermore, this
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effect was due to differences in the Honest Ethical 
Climate condition, in which people lied more 
when there were no formal rules, F(2,l 12)=3.75, 
p<.05. This effect is illustrated in Figure 1. It 
could be summarized by saying that among the 
participants with a high tolerance for ambiguity, 
the combination of formal rules about honesty and 
an ethical work climate led people to tell the truth 
more than when there were no formal rules. 
Conversely, this implies that people with a high 
tolerance for ambiguity were more likely to lie to 
a customer when an honest climate was combined 
with formal rules pertaining to the action. No 
other effects were significant.
In summary, hypotheses 4 and 5 were supported. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 6, and 7 were not supported, but 
the complex interaction of tolerance for ambigui­
ty, rules, and culture captures some of the ele­
ments of those hypotheses in a way explained in 
the discussion. The nature of these findings, their 
explanations and implications are discussed in the 
following section.
DISCUSSION
There are three central findings of this study. The 
first is that people who are more Machiavellian are
more likely to lie in business. The second is that 
formal rules against lying seem to affect the hon­
esty of people who are low in Machiavellianism. 
The third finding is that having consistent rules 
and climate has an impact on lying behaviour, but 
only among people comfortable with ambiguity. 
We will explain and interpret these findings in the 
context of the non findings and contemporary 
ethics literature.
Explanations
That people with more Machiavellian tendencies 
were more likely to lie in order to achieve their 
objectives is a straightforward example of 
Machiavellianism at work. To Machiavellians the 
ends justify the means, because they are much 
more interested in accomplishing their goals than 
they are in the morality of the process. Hence, the 
highly Machiavellian people responded to the 
pressure of the situation to benefit themselves. 
Previous research has identified this basic person­
ality trait leading to more dishonesty (Ross & 
Robertson, 2000; Wardle & Gloss, 1982) and 
more successful lying (Geis & Moon, 1982; 
O'Hair, Cody, & McLaughlin, 1981).
More intriguing than the simple finding that
FIGURE 1: Honesty Means by Climate & Rule Orientation, High Tolerance for Ambiguity Case
5,82
3.77
'< 4 5
6,15
~~~SM
Control
Honest
Dishonest
No Formal Rules Formal Rules
Note: The only means that are significantly different from one another occur in the honest condition between 
formal rules (6.15) and No Formal Rules (5.45).
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Machiavellians lie more was how this individual 
difference was influenced by the situation. People 
who were highly Machiavellian were not influ­
enced by the rule orientation of the organisation; 
however, people who were low in the trait told the 
truth more often when there were formal rules. 
Machiavellianism is an overwhelming characteris­
tic and people high in this characteristic apparently 
take little notice of the cues around them. In con­
trast, people who are not as focussed on achieving 
their outcomes in a Machiavellian fashion were 
more honest when the formal rules of the organisa­
tion encouraged that honesty. This finding is con­
sistent at a grand level with previous work that has 
taken the interactionist perspective (Grover, 1993a, 
1993b; Trevino, 1986), but extends that perspective 
to Machiavellianism. Some people are more 
attuned to their environment or seek cues from the 
environment to make moral decisions. The present 
study extends previous work that has shown people 
at higher stages of moral development are less 
influenced by situations (Grover, 1993b), as well as 
those with more internal locus of control (Trevino 
& Youngblood, 1990).
Our findings concerning the conjoint effect of 
rules and ethical climate offer contrast to Trevino 
and colleagues' (2001) findings concerning how 
formal structures and culture work together. They 
found more ethical behaviour when codes of ethics 
and culture were consistent, that people first look 
to rules to guide their ethical decisions, and in the 
absence of clear guidance people look to their 
environment for cultural cues about acceptable 
behaviour. Our findings shown in Figure 1 sup­
port this first part of their claim: In the presence 
of formal rules there was no significant difference 
among the different culture conditions. Formal 
rules seem to take precedence in their effect on 
ethical behaviour. However, our findings ran con­
trary to Trevino and colleagues' (2001) second 
assertion, that we secondarily look to social cues. 
In the honest climate conditions people lied more 
when there were no formal rules. This is a queru­
lous finding: that people are less honest than the 
culture suggests that they should be. Our post-hoc 
speculations concerning this finding is consistent 
with other findings reported by Grover (2005). 
This speculation is that creating structures that 
attempt to impose cultural constraints on dishon­
esty might simply drive the dishonesty below the 
surface. Aquino and his colleagues (2004) found
in a negotiation study that people lied just as fre­
quently in a strongly honest normative culture, but 
yet they subsequently lied more about their deceit 
compared to a weaker or non existent normative 
culture. Moreover, reactance theory suggests that 
people respond to demands placed on them oppo­
site the desired direction when their freedom is 
constrained (Brehm, 1985). Reactance theory 
potentially explains greater lying in that one hon­
est culture condition because the absence of for­
mal rules takes on a freedom that is then con­
strained by the imposition of the honest culture. 
These speculations can only be addressed proper­
ly with future research.
The interaction of rules and climate only affected 
people high in tolerance for ambiguity. Our 
hypothesis was that people high in tolerance for 
ambiguity would be more influenced in their lying 
behaviour by social information drawn from the 
ethical climate than would the people low in the 
trait. The reasoning is that people high in this trait 
need less concrete information and have greater 
ability to make sense of the jumble of disparate 
information. The interaction between culture and 
rules for participants who were high in tolerance 
for ambiguity is consistent with the prediction that 
those high in this trait are more influenced by 
social information. It was only those people with 
the facility to deal with ambiguous information 
who were affected by the sometimes conflicting 
expectations presented by the formal rules and the 
culture of the organisation. The other participants, 
who are not so comfortable with ambiguity, were 
not so sensitive to the sometimes conflicting 
demands placed on them in this situation as 
demonstrated by no particular behavioural 
response from the rules and culture. Like the find­
ings for Machiavellians, these findings support the 
interactionist perspective of personality influenc­
ing how people respond to their environment.
Practical Implications
The primary finding that Machiavellian people lie 
more and that they disregarded rules is informative 
to organisation participants. While it is somewhat 
too easy to portray Machiavellians as “bad” and 
unethical, it might be more practically prudent to 
focus on the non-Machiavellian individuals. One 
way of interpreting our findings is that the people 
who were low on the Machiavellianism scale were
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more influenced by rules. That is to say that those 
people were more likely to lie when there were no 
formal rules against it, which in most ways is not a 
particularly more “ethical” stance. The practical 
implication, therefore, is that providing rules to 
inform behaviour will work for some of the people 
some of the time, which is a practical step toward 
developing honesty in organisations.
Our finding that formal rules and culture work 
together to enhance honesty is of practical utility. 
There is a lay debate on whether organisations can 
legislate ethical behaviour, or whether it comes 
from the individual or the general attitudes of 
organisation participants. Combined with other 
research, the present study suggests that maxi­
mum ethical behaviour should be derived from 
both ethical cultures and rules or regulations. 
This point cannot be undersold. In the present 
study the most honesty occurred in the honest cul­
ture when formal rules supported it. Managers 
could encourage the most honesty and ethical 
behaviour when they model that behaviour and 
achieve its shared understanding and provide the 
rules, regulations, and even enforcement to sup­
port that softer message.
This study provides some further evidence that sit­
uations and personality interact, and that some 
people are more attuned to the requirements of the 
situation than are others. Of course there might be 
methodological limitations that would prevent the 
culture effect from implanting itself in a short term 
laboratory experiment.
Limitations
A number of limitations should be considered in 
cautiously interpreting the present study. First, 
we should be cautious in the way that we gener­
alise these results. This is a laboratory study 
using student participants, and as such the con­
text is not so rich as that found in the field. The 
present data offer the luxury of random experi­
mental assignment and its concomitant clarity of 
effects. However, the participants were not at 
their real desks despite attempts to make the set­
ting appear to be a real office. These data should 
be interpreted, therefore, in the context of relat­
ed field studies such as Trevino and her col­
leagues (2001).
Another potential limitation concerns the meas­
urement of the dependent variable. The central 
reported dependent variable was a self-report 
item. These items were not opinion items, so 
much as asking participants to report a fact of 
whether they lied or not in the two letters. These 
items should have validity since the participants 
would expect us to match their actual written let­
ters with the results of the post-experimental 
questionnaire. A self-report measure was used in 
order to focus on the participants' intent to either 
tell the truth or lie. The actual letters were coded 
for honesty, but the reality of the world was that 
the 'lie' could be obfuscated in the letter by not 
mentioning, in this case, the date of delivery or 
not mentioning that there was even a delay. Bok 
(1978) referred to these two types of lies as con­
cealment and deception. The present study pur­
posely focussed on true, intended deception as 
opposed to concealment.
A further interpretative caution for the present 
study has to do with the pattern of results. While 
we have attempted to explain the results in light of 
the previous research, not all the hypotheses were 
clearly supported. In particular, we did not find 
the straight main effects for formal rules and cul­
ture that we expected. Instead we found that they 
interacted for just the people who were high in tol­
erance for ambiguity. Interestingly, the pattern of 
results found in Trevino et al (2001) is similarly 
not straightforward. While we cannot rule out the 
possibility of type I error, future research and the­
ory should also consider the possibility that these 
two constructs take on only the conjoint effect that 
we have found as opposed to the straightforward, 
direct impact on ethical behaviour.
Conclusion
The present study adds to our knowledge about 
what causes lying. Previous empirical work has 
already shown that people will lie in negotiations 
(Boles et al., 2000), under role conflict (Grover & 
Hui, 1994; Schweitzer et al., 2004), and that indi­
vidual differences of moral development influ­
enced that (Grover, 1993a). We can add to this 
knowledge that manipulating the rules will have 
an impact on people who are a little less self inter­
ested in any event. It would be interesting to con­
firm the findings in the field that people have 
similar influences of situation as found in the 
present study.
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